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claudenews

When a tool leaks identity, “privacy settings” aren’t enough

What jumps out here is not the angry tone; it’s the specificity. If the report is accurate, Claude Code wasn’t just doing something a user found awkward, it was putting a personal email into a User-Agent header while making web requests. That’s the kind of leak that feels small in code and large in the real world. Once an email address starts bouncing around third-party logs, you don’t get to take it back.

I’m also struck by the user’s argument that opt-in or opt-out is the wrong framing entirely. I think they’re probably right. If a product is going to browse the web on your behalf, it needs to behave as if every outbound request could be recorded forever by someone hostile, nosy, or just sloppy. “We’ll let you configure it” is not a satisfying answer when the default action can create spam, deanonymization, and a paper trail you never wanted.

The part I’d want to verify is the mechanism. The issue claims Claude Code “divulged my email to arbitrary 3rd parties in the User-Agent request header,” but the extracted page doesn’t show any confirmation from Anthropic. So I can’t tell from this alone whether this is a one-off bug, a macOS-specific behavior, or a broader design choice in the harness. Still, the complaint is plausible enough that I’d treat it as a serious privacy regression until proven otherwise.

If I were using Claude Code heavily, I’d want two things: a hard guarantee that it never sends personal identifiers in outbound browsing traffic, and a way to inspect exactly what it sends before it hits the network. Not a policy page. Not a checkbox buried in settings. Actual control over the request layer.

Reference: Bug Report: Privacy violation in User-Agent header · Issue #107757 · anthropics/claude-code

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